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ABSTRACT
The popularity of the Internet of Things (IoT) devices makes it in-
creasingly important to be able to fingerprint them, for example
in order to detect if there are misbehaving or even malicious IoT
devices in one’s network. However, there are many challenges faced
in the task of fingerprinting IoT devices, mainly due to the huge
variety of the devices involved. At the same time, the task can po-
tentially be improved by applying machine learning techniques for
better accuracy and efficiency. The aim of this paper is to provide a
systematic categorisation of machine learning augmented techniques
that can be used for fingerprinting IoT devices. This can serve as a
baseline for comparing various IoT fingerprinting mechanisms, so
that network administrators can choose one or more mechanisms
that are appropriate for monitoring and maintaining their network.
We carried out an extensive literature review of existing papers on
fingerprinting IoT devices – paying close attention to those with
machine learning features. This is followed by an extraction of im-
portant and comparable features among the mechanisms outlined in
those papers. As a result, we came up with a key set of terminologies
that are relevant both in the fingerprinting context and in the IoT
domain. This enabled us to construct a framework called IDWork,
which can be used for categorising existing IoT fingerprinting mech-
anisms in a way that will facilitate a coherent and fair comparison
of these mechanisms. We found that the majority of the IoT fin-
gerprinting mechanisms take a passive approach – mainly through
network sniffing – instead of being intrusive and interactive with the
device of interest. Additionally, a significant number of the surveyed
mechanisms employ both static and dynamic approaches, in order to
benefit from complementary features that can be more robust against
certain attacks such as spoofing and replay attacks.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Biometrics; • Networks→ Layering; •
Computer systems organization→ Sensor networks; • Comput-
ing methodologies → Machine learning approaches; Modeling
methodologies; • General and reference→ Measurement.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Device fingerprinting is a process of identifying a device or device
type based on its unique intrinsic or behavioural properties [18,
21, 50]. Device fingerprinting is very popular in internet-connected
general purpose computing devices to track user behaviour and ap-
plication usage. Some of the interesting applications include browser
fingerprinting for web analytics, user tracking, fraud detection and
accountability [9, 23, 27] and have gained a significant interests from
cyber-security community. While it is clear that device fingerprinting
can bring a lot of benefits – especially for providing automated and
customisable user experience – there are also concerns that it can
pose security and privacy risks [29, 39]. On the other hand, it has
been suggested that device fingerprinting can also be used to help
improve the security of smart home automation [24, 52].
There are three main properties that need to be satisfied in order
to achieve effective fingerprinting of devices [50]:
• unique identity property: the device fingerprint has to be
unique for the device;
• integrity property: the fingerprints must be impossible – or at
least, difficult – to forge;
• reproducibility property: the features used in the fingerprint-
ing process must be stable, especially in the presence of
environment changes and mobility.
The increased prevalence of Internet of Things (IoT) devices
makes the task of fingerprinting devices more challenging. To start
with, there is a great variety of IoT devices available on the market,
and there are many different ways for them to operate. These pose a
challenge in creating a generic mechanism that can perform accu-
rate fingerprinting of all IoT devices. Furthermore, there are some
fundamental differences between IoT devices and general comput-
ers (for which, more mature fingerprinting mechanisms have been
developed). For example, IoT devices do not have many standard
browser-based applications, which means many standard fingerprint-
ing mechanisms will not work for IoT devices. Moreover, many
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IoT devices do not have a standard Graphical User Interface (GUI)
and they might even work autonomously in pervasive environments
without user’s direct control.
Due to resource constraints and insecure designs, IoT devices are
prone to be involved in cyber-attacks, ranging from being the target
[22, 45] to being exploited to create a botnet to mount a massive
Distributed Denial of Service attack [3, 16]. Therefore, it is necessary
and desirable to be able to automatically detect whether certain IoT
devices might be vulnerable or could be exploited in cyber-attacks.
The automatic device identification is one of the core requirements
for building a secure IoT ecosystem, including cyber-attack and
anomaly detection systems and automatic management and control.
Various device fingerprinting mechanisms have been proposed in
the last few years. However, not all of these mechanisms are suitable
for the IoT domain. Many IoT device fingerprinting mechanisms are
only suitable for specific use cases or tailored to certain requirements,
making it challenging to choose a correct fingerprinting mechanism
that will be appropriate for a new use case, for example. This short-
coming is the motivation behind our paper. In this paper, we explore
and collate existing IoT fingerprinting mechanisms – especially those
that leverage Machine Learning (ML) techniques – and present a
holistic view and terminologies used in the fingerprinting context,
which can be used for further research and development.
Contributions. The key contributions of our paper are:
• The compilation of a key set of fingerprinting terminologies.
• The identification of important features to be included for
achieving effective and accurate fingerprinting of IoT devices.
• The construction of IDWork: a systematic framework for cat-
egorising IoT device fingerprinting mechanisms, which can
be used for comparing and selecting suitable fingerprinting
mechanism(s) for an IoT application.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides
some background and related work, while Section 3 outlines the
methodology we followed in our research. Section 4 represents the
core of our work, giving an overview of the IDWork framework,
along with the key terminologies and our results. Finally, Section 5
concludes our paper and provides some ideas for future work.
2 RELATED WORK
Several papers have discussed various fingerprinting mechanisms,
although they are not necessarily dedicated to IoT devices [15, 49,
50]. Cunche et al. [10] looked into device fingerprinting based on
monitoring wireless probes that a device may make, based on the
preferred network (access points) stored on that device. The main
concern of the paper was privacy infringement, for example by
exploiting information contained in the fingerprint to infer social
links between device owners. Spooren et al. [46] provides a critical
assessment of device fingerprinting for risk-based authentication. In
particular, they pointed out that device fingerprinting carries a lot of
similarity among mobile devices, making this approach less reliable
for risk assessment and step-up authentication.
Ferrag et al. [14] looked at human physiological and behavioural
features in their investigation into factors that might hinder bio-
metrics models’ development and deployment on a large scale for
authenticating IoT devices. They classified related survey papers
based on deployment scope, focus biometric area, threat models,
countermeasures, as well as the ML algorithms and Data Mining
methods used by existing authentication and authorisation schemes
for IoT devices. The paper also listed a set of biofeatures that can
be used for biometric authentication of IoT devices, including gaze
gestures, electrocardiogram, keystroke dynamics, fingerprint, ear
shape and hand geometry [14]. They focus only on biofeatures, so
other traits (such as network characteristics and device information)
are not considered.
Skowron et al. [45] study the information leakage exposed by
traffic fingerprinting attacks. They use features of statistical network
flows and ML. Hence, this approach is effective even when the IoT
traffic is encrypted. This approach relies on decision trees (CART
classifier) and heuristically creates random forests out of 100 trees.
The proposed approach aims at both device identification as well as
the detection of anomalous user activities. The latter is based on fea-
tures such as packet size, packet inter-arrival time, and transmission
rate.
Hamad et al. [21] perform IoT device identification using traffic
characteristics (network flows), based on real-time devices connected
to an IP network. A passive behavioural fingerprinting approach is
used, while device classification is based on features extracted from
both packet header and payload. These include IP address, packet
size, and other traffic related features. The authors investigated dif-
ferent supervised learning classifiers such as ABOOST, LDA, KNN,
Decision Tree, Naive Bayesian, and SVM Random Forest (RF), with
RF showing the best performance.
3 METHODS
Between March and June 2020, we carried out a systematic review of
relevant papers that have been published on various venues, includ-
ing USENIX, ACM, IEEE, Nature, ScienceDirect, MDPI, Springer,
Elsevier, and Hindawi. We also utilised Google Scholar for compari-
son and for augmenting our search. The following keywords were
used to gather the initial set of papers: “IoT”, “fingerprinting”, “de-
vice identification”, “device authentication”, “device authorisation”,
“traffic filtering”, “anomaly detection”.
We then divided up these papers among ourselves in order to
analyse them and to extract key features of each paper. In order to be
able to compare these papers fairly and consistently, we constructed
a framework we call IDWork, as outlined in Section 4.2. At various
stages, we also performed synchronisation checks among ourselves
to make sure the process is robust and consistent.
Further papers were added to the list between July and Septem-
ber 2020, mostly as a result of following up cited papers by those
in the initial main list. The same analysis and extraction process
using IDWork were applied to these additional papers to ensure
consistency.
Our process came up with a final list of 31 articles from the 142
papers that we analysed carefully. The papers in our final list are
shown in Table 1, which is constructed by populating a table as a
result of applying our IDWork framework.
4 OVERVIEW OF IDWORK
For building IDWork, we systematically reviewed the literature and
recent state-of-the-art work to understand different terminologies
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Figure 1: Edge/IoT device network end-to-end components
used in IoT fingerprinting mechanisms. We simplified the presen-
tation of IoT end-to-end ecosystem, as shown in Figure 1. The
Edge/IoT device – showing the TCP/IP networking stack – is par-
titioned horizontally. The upper partition represents software fea-
ture extraction, which is composed of application, networking and
Medium Access (MAC) layers. The lower partition represents hard-
ware feature extraction comprising of two sub-layers - the first layer
(upper) represents the features extracted from the Physical Network
Layer along with the firmware and hardware (Networking Interface
responsible for Link/Physical layer communication) layers and the
second layer (lower) represents the hardware features which ex-
plicitly use the hardware device. Similarly, same layer partition is
performed at Network Gateway and Cloud Node.
4.1 Fingerprinting terminology
In this section, we explain the key terminology that is important to
grasp, before we define the IDWork framework.
Passive vs Active Fingerprinting: In passive fingerprinting, we
collect information produced by a device and create an identification
pattern by only observing the data coming from the device, i.e., no
interaction with the device is carried out. In active fingerprinting,
we instigate the target device to produce useful information, e.g. by
making the device emit particular signals (at the physical-layer), or
by producing packets which require a specific response from the
device (at the network-layer). Thus, the difference between the two
methods is that the former uses a sniffer to capture and analyse traffic,
but it does not send traffic to the target [53], while the latter sends
queries to the target and analyses the response.
Static Feature vs Dynamic Feature Fingerprinting: A static fea-
ture fingerprinting includes only features that do not usually change
over the time (e.g. MAC address), while dynamic feature finger-
printing uses dynamic features that can change over time such as
inter-arrival time associated with data flow.
Adaptive vs Fixed Fingerprinting Algorithms: An “adaptive” fin-
gerprinting approach uses an algorithm that changes in response to
certain conditions observed during the fingerprinting process. On the
other hand, when the fingerprinting process always uses the same
(deterministic) algorithm with pre-determined and constant parame-
ters for all cases observed, we can consider that as “fixed”.
Hardware Feature vs Software Feature Fingerprinting: The for-
mer approach uses features that are extracted using special Physical
Unclonable Function (PUF) circuits to capture hardware-intrinsic
properties. The latter approach uses behavioural software properties,
which could be found in the network traffic generated by the IoT
device.
Rule-based vs ML-based Fingerprinting: In rule-based approaches,
the fingerprinting criteria are mathematically-formalised in the form
of if-then-else rules. Such rules are often defined by thresholds and
used to create fingerprints by capturing the correlation between the
features/parameters. In ML-based fingerprinting, an ML model is
created using the input features/parameters, and trained on the data
to learn possible data correlations for generalisation.
Device vs Network vs Cloud Level: Fingerprinting approaches can
act on different levels. Usually in the case of device-level fingerprint-
ing, the approach generates a device signature which relies on its
hardware characteristics, e.g. Radio Signal or clock skew. When the
approach analyses network traffic – i.e. there is an additional entity
within the network that monitor the traffic to produce device pattern
– we refer to it as network-level fingerprinting. It is even possible
that fingerprinting procedures are applied externally to a network so
that they can be executed on multiple networks. We refer to this case
as cloud-level figerprinting.
White-box vs Black-box Fingerprinting: White-box fingerprint-
ing is possible when we can directly access a device’s firmware
source code and then build a dynamic model of that device [28].
Black-box fingerprinting exploits the interaction between different
layers (e.g. application layer and transport layer) to build devices’
fingerprints.
Unique Device Identification vs Type Identification vs Class Iden-
tification: Fingerprinting approaches can have different outputs de-
pending on the designer’s goal. In particular they can produce: a
unique device identifier, device model or device class (devices with
similar properties).
Supervised vs Unsupervised ML-based Fingerprinting: Super-
vised learning involves labeled data, which means that a prior knowl-
edge about the classification of the learning data is provided. Con-
versely, unsupervised learning involves unlabeled data, so the ML
goal is to infer a suitable classification of the data involved as well
as classifying the data.
Radio vs MAC vs Network vs Application Layer: Radio finger-
printing exploits the unique characteristics in the radio signal emitted
by a device. MAC fingerprinting exploits the characteristics of the
data frames produced by a device (e.g. probe request in Wi-Fi). In
network fingerprinting, the network packet parameters are used to
build an identification pattern. Application fingerprinting approaches
typically gather information to find out the device’s services and
operating system.
Open-world vs Close-world Evaluation: Open-world refers to any
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approach that is able to identify IoT devices within a larger set of
devices not only restricted to IoT devices. Closed-world is when
identification is evaluated on data that is restricted to only IoT de-
vices.
Network Packet vs Flow-based Features: A fingerprinting ap-
proach that relies on network traffic can use packet-based or flow-
based features, or both. Packet-based features use the content of
individual packet payloads and headers, whereas flow-based features
are based on temporal features of multiple packets coming from
the same device, e.g. packet flow direction, inter-arrival time and
inter-packet length [33].
Network Packet Header vs Deep Packet Based Features: When
fingerprinting involves packet payload we refer to it as using deep-
packet features. Otherwise, when only packet header parameters are
used to build an identification pattern, we refer to it as using packet
header features.
Encrypted vs Unencrypted Network Traffic: Some fingerprinting
approaches do not need access to the packet payload, i.e. they can
work on both encrypted and unencrypted packets. Conversely, others
are designed to work on encrypted and unencrypted packet payloads,
such as the algorithm proposed by Robyns et al. [40] which exploits
per-bit entropy analysis (MAC address randomization). Furthermore,
some approaches are able to extract the features required only if the
payload is not encrypted.
Real Devices vs Simulated: Fingerprinting approaches based on
deep-learning algorithms require a large amount of data to properly
identify devices. Moreover, budget constraints do not allow for a
large number of devices to produce an exhaustive dataset for eval-
uation purposes. Thus, tools to simulate IoT devices are used (e.g.
Node-RED [25]). In this case, traffic flows and most of the important
features of typical categories of IoT devices – such as fridges or
washing machines – can be simulated and used to build datasets. On
the other hand, if real devices are used, the results will be more rep-
resentative of real-world scenarios, but the budgetary requirements
are higher as well.
Testbed vs Real World Evaluation: Fingerprinting approaches are
developed either on testbeds or in real-world environments. The
latter approaches provide additional resilience and deployment cred-
ibility for the fingerprinting algorithm.
4.2 IDWork Framework
The construction of IDWork started with an understanding of the
basic fingerprinting creation and verification workflow, as shown in
Figure 2. The fingerprinting process consists of three steps: (1) Fin-
gerprint template creation and storage, (2) Live fingerprint creation,
and (3) Fingerprint verification. We analysed different considerations
under each step. The task of initial template creation is a one-time
process. The live fingerprint creation process may or may not follow
the same approach or steps; however, the general approach follows
these two sub-steps every time: feature extraction from the raw in-
put features, and fingerprint generation. In the fingerprint template























Figure 2: IoT device fingerprinting workflow.
creation, the final step involving template storage and access mecha-
nism is essential. In our work, we have considered different options
under each sub-step (as shown in Figure 2), that differentiates one
fingerprinting mechanism from another. Some of these options are
either implementation-related or real-time deployment-related and
they need to be considered, analysed and accessed before deciding
an appropriate fingerprinting process suitable for an IoT application.
Some of the important options we explored are:
– Does fingerprint feature extraction, or creation mechanism
need device access to gather fingerprinting raw input?
– Does fingerprint feature extraction, or creation mechanism
need invasive mechanisms?
– Does fingerprint feature extraction, or creation mechanism
need additional hardware?
– What is the fingerprint feature extraction and creation, or
what is the storage location in the IoT end-to-end system, for
example, on the device, at a network gateway or on a cloud
server?
– What are the security, integrity, anti-tempering considerations
when storing and accessing the pre-created fingerprints?
– What is the computational complexity of individual steps?
After careful consideration, we picked seven labels categorised
under three broad steps: fingerprinting methods, fingerprinting in-
put features and fingerprinting output. We studied two categori-
sations under fingerprinting methods, namely Passive (P)/Active
(A) fingerprinting and Static (S)/Dynamic (D) fingerprinting. Un-
der fingerprinting input features, we considered categorisation us-
ing TCP/IP networking stack label and we used three choices:
MAC/Network/Application Layers under this label. We further anal-
ysed these layers with two sub-labels with these choices: Packet/-
Dataframe/Flow and Header/Payload. We also explored the mech-
anisms which use these sub-labels for fingerprint creation, and we
categorise them as Rule-based or ML-based. We classify fingerprint
output into three categories: Class, Type and Unique.
As a summary, in this work we present seven important features
(as shown in Table 1), which broadly allow for a systematic and
consistent way for classifying IoT fingerprinting mechanisms into
logical categories. In total, there are potentially 432 exhaustive com-
binations, but certain combinations are more prevalent than others.
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P S N P H ML+RB C [11]1
P S N P+F H RB T [41]
P S N F H ML C [2]
P S M+N P H+P ML C+T [6]




P D N P+F H+P ML C [47]
P D M DF H+P RB U [43]
P D M+N P H+P ML C2 [48]
P D M+N+A P+F H+P ML+RB U [44]
A S N P H+P ML C+T [53] Active and Static
A D M DF P ML - [7]
Active and Dynamic
A D A P H+P RB C+T [13]




P S+D N P H+P ML C [35]
P S+D N F H ML U [32]
P S+D N P H ML C [5]
P S+D N P+F P ML C [36]
P S+D N F P ML U [26]
P S+D N P H+P RB C+T [20]
P S+D N P H ML U [8]
P S+D N P+F H ML C [34]
P S+D N P+F H ML - [37]
P S+D N P+F H+P ML C [30]
P S+D N P+F H+P ML C [12]
P S+D M+N+A P+F H+P ML C [1]
P S+D N P+F H+P ML C [42]
P S+D N P+F H+P RB C [51]
A S+D - - - RB C [31]3
P+A S+D N P4 H+P ML C [29]
P+A D N F H ML U [38]
We perceive these popular categories as the more promising ap-
proaches that one should take in their effort to achieve a meaningful
fingerprinting exercise of IoT devices.
5 CONCLUSION
IoT fingerprinting has become an important research area, due to
the increased prevalence of IoT devices. Fingerprinting mechanisms
serve as a key component in a network administrator’s effort to
identify and categorise IoT devices, in order to be able to observe
and manage IoT devices in their network properly, especially in
relation to pinpointing potential causes of security problems.
There are many existing IoT fingerprinting mechanisms available,
but it is not easy to choose a suitable mechanism for one’s network,
1They use an ML algorithm only for evaluation purposes
2Their mechanism can also identify unique device events
3A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is being used rather than any network traffic
based approaches
4They also use Flow in the shape of inter-arrival time
because there is currently no consistent framework for analysing
these mechanisms. This is a gap that our paper aims to address.
Firstly, we compiled a list of key terminologies that are essential in
understanding and analysing IoT fingerprinting mechanisms. From
there, we carefully constructed a framework called IDWork, which
provides a frame of reference for a fair and consistent comparison
of these mechanisms. And finally, we demonstrated the usefulness
of our framework by populating a table with some example mech-
anisms. We mainly focused on the mechanisms that use Machine
Learning techniques. However, there are several mechanisms em-
ploying Rule-based techniques that are worth mentioning.
There are several key insights that came up from our research. We
found that the majority of existing IoT fingerprinting mechanisms
use a passive fingerprinting approach. This means a less intrusive
approach is generally favoured. Furthermore, a dynamic approach
– or a combination of both static and dynamic approaches – is very
popular, quite possibly due to the need to fulfill a liveness property
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to minimise the risk of stale data or replay attacks. On the other hand,
the least common mechanism seems to be based on a combination of
active and static approach. This could be because such a combination
might be more prone to a spoofing attack.
While we endeavoured to be as thorough and exhaustive as we
can in our research, we are aware that there are some limitations in
our work. For example, there are seven categories that we mainly
consider in our framework, as presented in Table 1. However, it is
possible that there are other categories that need to be considered
in more detail. Furthermore, our current classification is mostly
based on the software-related features of the IoT fingerprinting
mechanisms. It would be more complete if hardware-related features
– in particular, leveraging the Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)
features – are also considered.
An interesting direction for future work is to look at the distri-
bution and impact of IoT fingerprinting mechanisms and see if any
significant patterns emerge in terms of mechanisms that are more
popular or more effective, and how such patterns change over time.
Further work will also need to be carried out to validate our frame-
work. This could be done by utilising publicly available datasets
(provided by some IoT fingerprinting mechanisms) in an experiment
to classify real-world IoT devices in a live setting. This will allow
for the accuracy of existing mechanisms to be calculated, enabling a
fairer comparison of these mechanisms to be performed. Achieving
this will enable system administrators to justify their choices with
regard to which IoT fingerprinting mechanism(s) they would like to
employ in their network.
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